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Abstract 
Following recent judgement of the Supreme Court of US (June 2014), several 
commentators had declared that “Securities class actions are here to stay” 
(insidecounsel.com – September 2014, 11). This paper provides a critical 
perspective on this judgement, which “implicates substantive issues at the 
intersection of economic theory, financial markets, and securities regulation” (128 
Harv. L. Rev. 291 2014-2015, 291), and shows that we must be much more 
careful. This recent judgement is based on the Fraud on the Market Doctrine, 
which was introduced in 1973 in order to preserve the class action procedure in 
securities fraud litigation. The characteristic of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine 
is to have been structured from one of the most popular financial theory: Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. In this paper, by analysing the implementation of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis in Fraud on the Market Theory, we argue that if the Supreme 
Court had to take position for a second time about the Fraud on the Market 
Doctrine it is due to the practical difficulties inherited from Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and that have raised several problems to the US courts, including the 
Supreme Court. This issue is illustrated by the definition of Efficient Market 
Hypothesis lawyers used (“most” vs “all”/”fully”). As this paper shows, if 
“Securities class actions are here to stay”, the opportunity to open such a class 
action is strongly reduced in the facts. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In June 2014, the Supreme Court of US provided a new judgment on the Fraud 
of the market theory. Several commentators had declared that “Securities class 
actions are here to stay” (insidecounsel.com – September 2014, 11). This paper 
provides a critical perspective on this judgement and shows that we must be 
much more careful. This article analyzes how the Efficient Market Theory, one of 
the most popular theories of financial economics, has been used in the 
development of Fraud on the Market Doctrine (also called Fraud on the Market 
Theory), a key legal doctrine in modern securities fraud litigation. How should 
courts deal with modern securities fraud, where a misleading misrepresentation 
can have a global impact on the market and affect investors who may not even 
be aware of the controversial statement? American courts have chosen to 
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replace the individual reliance traditionally required in fraud lawsuits with the idea 
that the price of shares in an efficient market “reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentation” (Erica P. John Fund v. 
Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179 [2011]). Thus, under the Fraud on the Market 
Doctrine, courts may presume that an investor who buys or sells stocks at the 
market price did so on the strength of the public information that is the subject of 
the litigation. This idea was borrowed from financial economists, who formulated 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the 1960s. 
 
In this article, we study how the Efficient Market Hypothesis has been introduced 
into American law through the Fraud on the Market Doctrine. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis was one of the most important theories in the development of 
financial economics and is nowadays considered one of the main hypotheses 
underlying financial theories and models. Although the history of this theory and 
the circumstances that led to its creation is often ignored, it has been pointed out 
that it is polymorphous and that its empirical validity is controversial – particularly 
among financial economists themselves. Consequently, the theory is not so easy 
for jurists to use as might be imagined. In this article, we contrast the history of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the discipline of financial economics with its 
reception in U.S. case law and the development of securities litigation since the 
1970s. Then, we identify the major differences in the way the two fields 
understand and use market efficiency. 
 
The first part studies how the Efficient Market Hypothesis has been progressively 
incorporated into the definition of Fraud on the Market Doctrine, through 
successive cases that were decided in the 1970s and the 1980s. It also follows 
its development through judicial reasoning in a series of more recent cases and 
attempts to justify its extensive use by the US courts and the rationale behind its 
application in securities fraud litigation. The second part emphasizes the 
polymorphous dimension of this theory and the fact that its practical application 
has never been demonstrated, while it also addresses the consequences of this 
polymorphism and how the U.S. courts have progressively created a completely 
different interpretation of this theory. Our analysis will shed some light on recent 
debates that have taken place before the Supreme Court about the criteria for 
applying Fraud on the Market Doctrine and the necessity of adopting a strict 
definition of an efficient market. 
 
 
I. The legal roots of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine  
The legal roots of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine can be traced back to the 
first attempts to safeguard financial markets as well as the interests of investors 
from fraud and manipulation. This first part analyzes how the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis has been progressively incorporated into the Fraud on the Market 
Doctrine. We first look back at the origins of U.S. legislation designed to protect 
investors against frauds on financial markets. We then trace the progressive 
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creation of Fraud on the Market Doctrine and the role that Efficient Market 
Hypothesis has played in its development. Emphasis will be given to the seminal 
case of Basic and the subsequent case law up until the most recent Halliburton 
case. 
 
I.1) The legal origins of Fraud on the Market Doctrine 
Following the 1929 stock market crash, two ground-breaking pieces of legislation 
were introduced in an attempt to protect investors in the financial markets: the 
Securities Act of 1933 (c. 38 §1, 48 Stat. 74, codified at 15 U.C.S. 77a-77aa), the 
first major federal legislation regulating trade in securities, which focused on 
mandatory disclosure requirements and gave private plaintiffs new rights of 
action1; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (c. 404 §1, 48 Stat. 881, 
codified at 15 U.C.S. 78a-78pp), governing the trading of securities on secondary 
markets, which created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the 
public enforcer of federal securities law. Both statutes reflected the Congress’ 
intention to safeguard the integrity of the US market and to restore the public 
confidence in this well-developed, but impersonal, market. Such powerful 
legislative response sent a clear message that the United States were putting 
strong emphasis on shareholders’ rights through disclosure requirements, rights 
of action and remedies for recovery of losses caused to investors by fraudulent 
conduct (Duffy 2005, 623, Mahoney 2009, 331). 
 
In 1942, under the rule-making authority conferred under section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act, the SEC introduced Rule 10b-5 (“Employment of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Practices”) in the Code of Federal Regulations (17 C.F.R. 240). This 
rule provides a scheme by which investors would sue for damages caused by 
deceit regarding stocks. The initial judicial interpretation of Rule 10b-5 was 
derived from the common law tort of fraud, and required plaintiffs (i.e. investors) 
to provide evidence of an intentional misstatement or omission of a material fact 
on which they had relied and which had been the proximate cause of their injury.  
 
The reliance element requires the plaintiffs to prove that they relied on the 
misleading public statements of the defendants (the company’s directors, the 
bank, the asset manager, etc.), which caused them to suffer a loss. Easy to 
establish in the context of face-to-face transactions, this reliance requirement 
proved much harder for plaintiffs to satisfy in the context of mass impersonal 
transactions, such as those carried out in developed securities markets.2 Were 
the reliance requirement to be strictly construed, it would require a practically 
impossible investigation into the individual state of mind of several thousand 
                                            
1 The Act requires that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning 
securities being offered for public sale; and prohibits deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud 
in the sale of securities.  
2 See 17 CFR § 240 10b-5; Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v Scientific Atlanta Inc (2008) 
128 S. Ct. 761 at 769; Dura Pharm Inc v Broudo (2005) 125 S. Ct. 1627 at 1631. 
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members of the class – thus barring all securities fraud litigation from being the 
vehicle of access to justice that class action was initially designed to be. 
 
Class actions gain their legitimacy from principles of judicial economy and 
efficiency, so a class action that does not ensure efficiency is by definition 
problematic (Gordon 2013). According to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a class action is permitted, if ‘the court finds that the questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy’ (Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3)). This requirement that common issues ‘predominate’ over 
individual issues is extremely important, because ‘[r]equiring proof of 
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class 
effectively would [prevent named plaintiffs] from proceeding with a class action, 
since individual issues then would … overwhelm […] the common ones’ (Basic, 
231). 
 
The Fraud on the Market Doctrine emerged in the late 1960s as a judicial 
response to these difficulties attached to claims arising from Rule 10b-5. Under 
this Doctrine, the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s misstatements may be 
legally presumed where the relevant market is proved to be efficient. The 
Doctrine builds on arguments from financial economics, according to which in an 
efficient market, public information is reflected in the market prices of shares and 
conveyed to investors in this form; consequently, a person relying on the integrity 
of the market price can be said to rely indirectly on the public information it 
contains. This is why plaintiffs were using economists as expert witnesses, their 
reports and testimony in court in order to establish the efficiency of the market in 
question. 
 
As it will be shown, the Theory has undergone a long evolution process, from a 
mere relaxation of the traditional reliance requirement in securities transactions 
to its emergence as a definite doctrine based on financial economics and 
technical standards. It first appeared as ‘the artificially inflated market price 
theory’ in the late 1960s but it was in 1972 that the Supreme Court, without yet 
making an explicit reference to the Theory, accepted that a positive proof of 
reliance was not required in cases of an omission of material facts by a party with 
a duty to disclose, and that plaintiffs should recover as damages the difference 
between the fair value the seller received for his shares and the fair value he 
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct (Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 [1972]; “The fraud market theory” 
1982, 1146; (Duffy 2005).  
 
The Fraud on the Market Doctrine was then expressly introduced in 1973 by the 
District Court of California in the case of In re Consolidated Memory Cases (61 
F.R.D. 88 [1973]), which favoured an objective standard of reliance that focuses 
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on the “causal nexus” between the misinformation and the inflated price, in order 
to avoid the problem of showing the subjective intent of each investor in an action 
involving potentially 60,000 investors. In the context of a stock exchange, the 
sufficient assessment of reliance aims to determine whether a reasonable 
investor would have relied on the alleged misrepresentation. This objective 
standard of reliance was said to preserve the class action procedure in securities 
fraud litigation without altering defendants’ substantive rights. A similar reasoning 
was adopted in Tucker v. Andersen (67 F.R.D. 468 [1975]), where the court 
asserted that the introduction of this new kind of proof was not revolutionary, but 
merely a derivative reliance element, and that the individual reliance which 
prevailed before was not free from criticisms. Indeed, in these same years, legal 
scholars and practitioners were stressing the necessary adaptation of fraud 
claims (American College of Trial Lawyers 1972, Simon 1972). 
 
As it becomes apparent, in none of these cases so far was Fraud on the Market 
Doctrine explicitly associated with concepts drawn from financial economics. 
Posner in 1975 shared the belief that economics held the interdisciplinary key 
that would unlock the secret to a perfectly functioning legal system and explain 
the breakdowns in less than perfectly functioning legal systems (Posner 1975, 
763-764)3. However, the Doctrine was applied in such a way that it was ‘closer to 
civil procedure than financial economics’ (Langevoort 2009, 158). 
 
It was not before 1980 and the case of In re LTV Securities Litigation (88 F.R.D. 
134 [1980]) that the Fraud on the Market was clearly anchored in theoretical 
reasoning of financial economics. According to the federal court’s judgment, for a 
finding of reliance, it was sufficient to show that the plaintiff relied on the integrity 
of the market price of the share, which was distorted by the alleged misstatement 
of the defendant. The court revealed the market’s role as a “transmission belt” 
linking the available information on stocks and individual purchasers and sellers: 
 
With recent advances in the understanding of the economics of securities markets, it has 
become more demonstrable that reliance on the market price is conceptually 
indistinguishable from reliance upon representations made in face-to-face transactions 
(LTV Securities, at 142).  
 
The court referred directly to the viewpoints of financial economists to justify the 
introduction of this presumption in the court system. In this judicial reasoning, the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis was invoked as an additional justification for the 
already existing doctrine of Fraud on the Market, thereby strengthening the case 
for class actions in securities fraud litigation. In this perspective, the Efficient 
                                            
3 It is worth mentioning that Efficient market hypothesis did not only influence the legal system ; it 
also has been used as a framework in the computerization of financial markets (Schinckus 2008) 
but also in the international standardization of accounting conventions (Chane-Alune 2006, 
Miburn 2008), the legal policies in US (Hammer and Groeber 2007) and financial regulators 
(Muniesa 2003, Pardo-Guerra 2015). 
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Market Hypothesis is used for demonstrating that every fraudulent 
misrepresentation was necessarily reflected in stock prices, and that every 
investor could rely solely on those prices for transacting. Courts were therefore 
justified in relinquishing the requirement of direct reliance on the alleged 
misrepresentation whenever public information could have an automatic 
influence on prices. In LTV Securities, the court built on the concept of efficient 
market as it was directly borrowed from financial economics, quoting the 
economist Van Horne: 
 
Basically, efficient capital markets exist when security prices reflect all available public 
information about the economy, about financial markets, and about the specific company 
involved. Implied is that market price of individual securities adjusts very rapidly to new 
information. As a result, security prices are said to fluctuate randomly about their 
"intrinsic" values. To be sure, new information can result in a change in the "intrinsic" 
value of a stock, but subsequent stock price movements will follow what is known as a 
random walk. (LTV Securities at 144, citing Van Horne (1977, 45)) 
 
If there is a case that can be characterised as an endorsement of the use of 
financial economics in security fraud litigation, then this is the case of Basic, as 
the Fraud on the Market Theory as a basis for imposing liability on defendants is 
firmly grounded on well proven notions in financial economics about market 
efficiency. 
 
I.2) From Basic to Halliburton and beyond:  The Jurists’ Approach 
The judgment in Basic has been considered as a turning point in the history of 
securities litigation. In an attempt to help investors overcome the 
abovementioned difficulties with the reliance requirement, the Court, with a rather 
unusual majority of four Justices, created a presumption that investors in 
securities fraud cases may be presumed to rely on public misrepresentations 
about stock trading, as the price of stock traded in an efficient market will reflect 
all public, material information, including misrepresentations (Basic, 991). The 
presumption is based on the ability of the plaintiffs to show that public, material 
misstatements were in fact made and thus, presumably affected the stock’s price 
without having to prove that the investment decision in question was made based 
on these alleged misstatements (Carlson 2015). 
 
According to the Supreme Court’s reasoning, which followed the interpretation 
set out in LTV,  ‘the fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, 
in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is 
determined by the available material information regarding the company and its 
business … Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock 
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements … The causal 
connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock  in 
such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on 
misrepresentations’ (Basic, at 242). The Supreme Court saw this Theory as a 
‘practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of 
proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of [Federal 
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Rule of Civil Procedure] 23 (Gordon 2013, 510). 
 
Two phrases in the ruling in Basic encapsulate the jurists’ approach towards the 
Efficient Market Theory. The Justices did not undertake the task to ‘assess the 
general validity of the theory …’ (Basic, 242); they were obviously more 
concerned with its effectiveness and application in practice rather than its 
theoretical underpinnings. Secondly, they recognised the evolution and 
transformation of the modern securities markets and that it was prudent to define 
and apply the concepts of reliance and causation in a different way compared to 
the early fraud cases (Basic, 243-44; LTV Securities 143). After all, 
‘presumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in 
which direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult’ (Basic, 245). 
 
This particular presumption was created in order to help judges in overcoming 
‘an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who 
has traded on an impersonal market’ (Basic, 245). It was a practical solution to 
successfully bridge the gap between theory and practice. In theory,‘[a]ny showing 
that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price 
received (or paid) by the plaintiff or his decision to trade at a fair market price will 
be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance’ (Basic, 248). However, in 
practice it was almost impossible for defendants to successfully rebut the 
presumption (Weiss and Beckerman 1995, 2077). Milton Friedman argued in 
1953 that ‘[T]he relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is 
not whether they are descriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they 
are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question 
can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether 
it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.’ (Friedman 1953). 
 
The dissenting minority warned that “with no staff economists, no experts 
schooled in the ‘efficient-capital-market hypothesis,’ no ability to test the validity 
of empirical market studies, we are not well equipped to embrace novel 
constructions of a statute based on contemporary microeconomic theory” (Basic, 
253). In other words, courts should prove the efficiency of the market by 
themselves, independently of tests provided by financial economists – 
undertaking “a long journey without a particularly good compass.” (Langevoort 
2009, 167). 
 
Fuller observes that ‘[s]ome rebuttable presumptions have, in the course of time, 
gathered about them rules declaring what is sufficient to overcome them. So 
soon as you have begun to limit and classify those things which will rebut a 
presumption you are importing into the facts “an arbitrary effect” beyond their 
natural tendency to produce belief’ (Fuller 1930-31, 394). There were even 
‘empirical studies [that] have tended to confirm the premise that the market price 
of shares traded on well developed markets reflects all publicly available 
information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations. It has been noted that 
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‘it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on 
market integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?’ 
(Basic, 247). 
 
When the Court stated that ‘in an open and developed securities market, the 
price of a company's stock is determined by the available material information 
regarding the company and its business’, it was wading into an economic swamp 
many decades in the making. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, stock 
market gurus postulated that the value assigned to corporate shares in an open 
market reflects all information available about them (Fox 2010, xiii). This mind-set 
soon crystallised into a theory, the rational market theory, which built from the 
observation that stock prices move randomly (‘random walk’), to the claim that 
one cannot predict stock prices based on public information, and on to the 
conclusion that stock prices are fundamentally correct (Fox 2010, xiv). 
 
The period between 1987 and 2014 can be characterised as the period of reign 
for Basic. In 2014 the Supreme Court was faced with the challenge of having to 
confront its own creation. It was not the first time that the ruling in Basic was 
under attack. Starting from Amgen v Connecticut Retirement Plans, where 
Justices Alito and Scalia were extremely pessimistic about the fate of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and talked about the consequences of the theory as 
becoming from ‘arguably regrettable’ to ‘unquestionably disastrous’ (Amgen, 
1204-6), the Theory has been criticised as ‘naïve’, ‘simplistic’, ‘outdated’, in need 
of scrutiny, repudiated by empirical economics studies and also inconsistent with 
the Court’s jurisprudence in Wal-Mart v Dukes and Comcast v Behrend 4 . 
Perhaps the biggest concern had to do with the realisation that markets are not 
as efficient as anticipated and stock prices in an efficient market cannot possibly 
reflect all publicly available information immediately. 
 
Another important problematic issue comes to the surface if we examine carefully 
the cases before and after Basic. Basic established that the plaintiffs in a Rule 
10b-5 action must, in order to avail themselves of the Fraud on the Market 
presumption, prove that the stock market in which they transacted was efficient. 
Since the Supreme Court provided no definition of what makes a market efficient 
for legal purposes, this became the next hot topic in securities fraud cases. The 
first significant decision regarding the definition of the efficient market, Cammer 
v. Bloom (711 F. Supp. 1264 [1989]), gave a very realistic definition of what 
should qualify, in law, as an efficient market. ‘An efficient market is one which 
rapidly and accurately reflects new information in price’.  (Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 
                                            
4 ‘Under Basic, putative plaintiff classes bringing Rule 10b-5 claims are given special solicitude 
available to no one else – immunity from the very Rule 23 principles articulated in cases like Wal-
Mart and Comcast’. ‘At the very least, Basic’s outdated economic theory should undergo the 
searching scrutiny given to the methodologies proffered to establish predominance in Wal-Mart 
and Comcast’. 
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1264 at 1276, quoting Bromberg and Lowenfels (1988)) Therefore, Cammer can 
be seen as an attempt to transpose the economic concept of efficient market into 
very pragmatic considerations. 
 
Subsequently, in 2004, in a judgment that was overturned by the Court of Appeal 
in 2005, Justice Keeton had refused to rely on a strict economic definition of an 
efficient market: an ‘“efficient” market in the context of the “Fraud on the Market” 
theory is not one in which a stock price rapidly reflects all publicly available 
material information. Rather, the “efficient” market required for “Fraud on the 
Market” presumption of reliance is simply one in which “market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about 
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices”. (In re PolyMedica Securities 
Litigation, 224 F.R.D. 27 [2004] at 41, citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 246). 
 
Justice Keeton justified this definition by stressing the distinction between the 
theoretical definition provided by economists and the practical considerations 
necessary in legal proceedings, and reiterated the cautions of the Supreme Court 
in Basic: … the Court emphasized that no strict economic theory need be 
adopted by adjudication: “We do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular 
theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in 
market price.” (PolyMedica (2004), 224 F.R.D. at 40-41, citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 
249)  
 
The defendant appealed the decision, alleging an error of law in the interpretation 
of market efficiency, and the Court of Appeal of the First Circuit reversed the 
decision in 2005. By rejecting the prevailing definition of market efficiency 
advocated by PolyMedica and focusing instead on the general consideration by 
market professionals of most publicly announced material statements about 
companies, the district court applied the wrong standard of efficiency. For 
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory, we conclude that an efficient 
market is one in which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly 
available information (PolyMedica (2005), 432 F.3d at 14). 
 
The debate in PolyMedica between the district court and the First Circuit court 
about the most suitable definition of market efficiency illustrates the difficulty of 
adopting concepts imported from financial economics to fit into the purposes of 
the legal system. A crucial factor was also the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
define efficiency. This is how we arrived at the two most recent Supreme Court 
judgments on Fraud on the Market, Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton (131 S. Ct. 
2179 [2011]) [Halliburton I] and Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2398 (2014) [Halliburton II] 
 
The Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities during this period of more 
than 25 years to overrule Basic and challenge the Fraud on the Market Theory, 
but this never happened. No doubt that the rebuttal of the efficient-market 
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presumption would be another cornerstone in the area of securities fraud 
litigation. The Halliburton saga can be seen not as another opportunity, but as 
the golden opportunity for the Supreme Court to rebut the Basic presumption. 
Instead the Court held that the presumption of reliance on misrepresentations 
cannot be rebutted at the class certification stage with evidence of a lack of price 
impact. Defendants were only to be permitted to provide evidence of such lack of 
price impact at the class certification stage, instead of the merits stage. ‘[A]n 
indirect proxy [such as the Basic presumption] should not preclude direct 
evidence when such evidence is available; price impact is ... an essential 
precondition for any Rule 10b-5 class action’, but, according to Justice Thomas, 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption is ‘virtually irrebuttable in practice’ 
(Halliburton II, 2420 (Thomas J concurring). The decision in Halliburton II sent a 
clear message and preserved a crucial doctrine clearly favouring securities class 
action plaintiffs; adopting such approach it was revealed that the Court still 
values the role of the plaintiffs’ bar (Carlson 2015, 169). 
 
More specifically, it was held that requiring plaintiffs to prove price’s impact as a 
means to rebut the Basic presumption is inconsistent with the presumption itself 
and it would ‘radically alter the required showing for the reliance element of the 
Rule 10b-5 cause of action’. In fact ‘it makes no sense, and can readily lead to 
bizarre results’ (Halliburton II, 2414). The Court drew a clear line distinguishing 
proof of price from proof of materiality, as price impact is a key feature in the 
Basic construction. Fraud on the market was seen simply as an alternative 
means of satisfying reliance, an existing element of a claim. As a result, the 
reasoning did not alter the elements of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action and thus 
maintained the action’s original legal scope (Brown 2015, 2-34.2). The dissenting 
Justices (Scalia, Alito and Thomas) questioned the accuracy of the fraud on the 
market theory and were against the imposition of such a broad theory by judicial 
fiat (Halliburton II, 2427 (Thomas J concurring). 
 
The doctrine of fraud on the market is kept alive and shareholders in an efficient 
market are presumed to have relied on the integrity of the market price in making 
their investment decisions. However, the presumption of reliance can be rebutted 
at the class certification stage, provided that it can be proved that the alleged 
misrepresentation did not cause any distortion to the market price. This does not 
undermine the validity of the efficient market hypothesis or the extent to which 
the capital markets are fundamentally efficient. It just serves as a confirmation 
that there is no convincing evidence that the economic reality justifies the 
overruling of the Basic presumption. The Court performed a sensitive balancing 
exercise before deciding to preserve more than 25 years of established 
precedent as well as the ability of private parties to bring securities fraud actions. 
Class actions were not eliminated, but as a counterbalance companies were 
allowed to use event studies to challenge whether an allegedly fraudulent 
statement had in fact been absorbed by the market (see Local 703, I.B. of T. 
Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1259 
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(11th Cir. 2014) It is not a ground-breaking decision, rather a sensible one, as it 
does not change the status quo in the field of securities litigation and reflects an 
attempt to deal with the concerns about the existing inconsistencies in the 
context of class certification proceedings. 
 
The Justices, although not explicitly, supported the idea that at the end of the day 
it is the Congress, not the Supreme Court, that should decide and initiate such a 
reform in the securities class action rules. More specifically, it was acknowledged 
that the Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation to govern Rule 10b-5 
litigation instead of disturbing the Basic presumption, for instance the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act 1998 (Harv LR, vol 128: 291, 297-8). The same argument had 
been made by Justice Kagan in Amgen, where he underlined the relevance of 
congressional acquiescence: in order to reverse a case, there must be 
something ‘fundamentally different’ today than when the case was decided, that 
is ‘especially so….where the Congress has had every opportunity, and has 
declined every opportunity to change Basic’ (1184, 1201). 
 
Overall, the Court took a pragmatic stance towards the fraud on the market 
presumption and the policy implications of overruling Basic. Without this 
presumption, plaintiffs will not be able to prove class-wide reliance on 
misstatements; if plaintiffs cannot prove reliance, then they will be unable to 
satisfy the predominance requirement for class certification. As a result, 
individual plaintiffs, in absence of class classification, would have to sustain huge 
costs for bringing a claim (Rubenstein 2001, 392). 
 
Having examined the development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and the 
application of the Fraud on the Market Theory through the case law of the US 
courts, the next section will focus on the practical implications of the EMH from 
an economic viewpoint as well as the terminological issues and definitional 
problems that have arisen. 
 
 
II. Influence of the Efficient Market Hypothesis on Fraud on the Market 
Theory debates 
 
As we mentioned earlier, under the current understanding of the Fraud on the 
Market Theory, a demonstration of market efficiency by the plaintiff will open the 
door to a class action procedure. A securities fraud case will therefore typically 
involve a debate around whether or not the market, in which the securities were 
traded was efficient, with the plaintiffs (investors) trying to demonstrate this 
efficiency and the defendants (generally officers of the company) trying to 
disprove it.  
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The main problem with this approach lies in the polymorphous definition of 
market efficiency. As we will explain in this part, jurists base their arguments on 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis, but they understand and use this hypothesis 
very differently from the way that financial economists have formulated it, and 
view it. In this part, we first explain the way financial economists created this 
hypothesis. Second, we highlight that, while economists and jurists use the same 
vocabulary, they do not attach the same meaning to the concepts used. Third, 
we show that the consequences of this cleavage are not only theoretical, but also 
practical, and that a too formalistic legal understanding of market efficiency tends 
to lessen investors’ protection, as illustrated in the PolyMedica case.  
 
 
II.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis and its practical implication from an 
economic viewpoint 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis, which was created during the 1960s and the 
1970s, asserts that financial markets are “informationally efficient” (Jovanovic 
2008, 2010). It suggests that stock prices reflect all available information, and 
that, consequently, a security’s current price is equal to its intrinsic value (also 
called fundamental value). In addition, because new information arrives 
randomly, stock prices fluctuate randomly. While the consequence of the fact that 
stock prices reflect all available information (i.e. the actual price of a security is 
equal to its intrinsic value) is constitutive of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
courts have mainly focused on the first aspect of the theory only (that an efficient 
market means that all available information is reflected in prices), ignoring its 
second aspect (that price is equal to the fundamental value), which was the 
primary reason for the theory’s creation by financial economists.  
 
The definition of an efficient market that is generally used nowadays 
comes from Fama’s 1970 article: “a market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ 
available information is called ‘efficient’” (1970, 383). It is the definition on which 
courts based their own definitions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in Cammer 
(1989) and Basic (1988) cases; it is also the definition adopted in Polymedica 
(2005) case. Although this definition is often quoted, in particular by economists, 
it has created many theoretical and practical difficulties. In 1976, the economist 
LeRoy ()()()()showed that Fama’s 1970 demonstration is tautological and that his 
hypothesis is not testable. The effect of Fama’s (1976) response was to modify a 
bit his definition. The new definition supposed that investors know the “true” 
model for pricing securities at their equilibrium values. The major consequence of 
this change was to admit that any test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is a test 
of both market efficiency (i.e. prices correctly reflect all available information) and 
the model of equilibrium used by investors for evaluating the equilibrium price of 
securities (i.e. the fundamental or intrinsic value). Therefore, in the event of 
negative results for an empirical test of Efficient Market Hypothesis, we can 
either consider that the Efficient Market Hypothesis (i.e. the prices reflect all 
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available information) has been refuted (although the model of equilibrium is the 
right one) or, more importantly, that the model used has been refuted (although 
the market is efficient). Financial economists call this problem “joint hypothesis,” 
stating that, first, the market is efficient in equating asset prices with their intrinsic 
values; and second, that since we know what the intrinsic values are, we have a 
perfect asset pricing model. In this regard, whenever an empirical test rejects the 
hypothesis of an efficient market, we cannot know which part of this joint 
hypothesis (the Efficient Market Hypothesis or the model used to evaluate the 
assets) failed to work. In other terms, due to the joint hypothesis’ problem, 
Efficient Market Hypothesis loses a large part of his practical implications. 
 
 
II.2. “Efficient market”: one concept, several meanings 
 
Beyond the practical implications of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the definition 
of this hypothesis has raised many problems. First of all, we must clarify that 
jurists and economists both use the term “efficient market,” which would suggest 
that they understand the term in a similar way. The impression is strengthened 
by the explicit references to economic literature made by jurists. However, since 
the introduction of the Fraud on the Market Theory, crucial differences have crept 
into economists’ and jurists’ interpretation of what an efficient market is. A 
comparison between the way courts have used this concept to support the Fraud 
on the Market Theory and the way financial economists built this concept will 
enable us to point out two key differences in interpretation. The first concerns the 
use of the fundamental value, and the second, the kind of information reflected in 
prices. 
 
II. 2.a) The use of the fundamental value 
 
The first difference pertains to the use of the fundamental value. It has long been 
acknowledged that jurists face a dual definition of market efficiency, depending 
on the importance given to the notion of fundamental value. Fischel, in 1989, had 
already distinguished between a “trading-rule efficiency” and a “value efficiency”: 
 
Much of the discussion of efficient capital markets suffers from ambiguity concerning 
what characteristics capital markets must satisfy to be considered “efficient.” At least two 
definitions of “efficient” capital markets exist. The first […] focuses on the speed with 
which market prices reflect publicly-available information and whether the price reaction 
to new information is without bias. Under this definition, a market is efficient if it is 
impossible to devise a trading rule that systematically outperforms the markets […]. I 
refer to this definition as “trading-rule efficiency.” […]  
 
The second definition of efficient capital markets focuses on the extent to which security 
prices reflect the present value of the net cash flows generated by a firm’s assets. I refer 
to this definition of efficiency as “value efficiency” (Fischel 1989, 912-13). 
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While this distinction between these two efficiencies5 is very common amongst 
jurists nowadays, it was not clear at the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Basic (see Fisher 2005, 852), the fundamental case for the Fraud on the Market 
Theory (see part 1). The dissenting judges in Basic were indeed critical of Fraud 
on the Market Theory because, as J. White wrote, “it implicitly suggests that 
stocks have some “true value” that is measurable by a standard other than their 
market price.” (Basic, at 255) In commenting on this assertion, Fischel relied on 
this distinction between two kinds of efficiency: 
 
These points are correct but have nothing to do with the Fraud on the Market theory. 
Theory does not posit that there is some “true value” of an asset other than its price. On 
the contrary, theory assumes that market price is the best indicia of value which makes it 
all the more important that price not be distorted by fraudulent information (Fischel 1989, 
920). 
 
For Fischel, who was among the first to make such a distinction between 
“trading-rule efficiency” and “value efficiency”, the former is associated with the 
Fraud on the Market Theory in the following reasoning: 
 
The link between the concept of efficient capital markets and the Fraud on the 
Market theory is clear. The central premise of the Fraud on the Market theory is that 
prices of actively-traded securities reflect publicly-available information. The premise 
is roughly equivalent to the semi-strong version of efficient capital markets 
hypothesis.” (Fischel 1989, 911) 
 
By focusing on the public availability of information and on changes in stock 
market prices, jurists consider that their definition of market efficiency (“trading-
rule” or “mechanical efficiency”) can dispense with the issue of fundamental 
value. Such reasoning, however, is based on an erroneous reverse causality. 
Indeed, from the observation that both the legal doctrine of Fraud on the Market 
and the financial economic theory of efficient market posit the perfect integration 
of all publicly available information into financial prices, it is wrong to conclude 
that Fraud on the Market Theory logically involves the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis6. 
                                            
5 The terms used to describe these two definitions of efficient market can vary from one author to 
another. For instance, Fisher (2005) used the terms “Mechanical efficiency” and “Value 
efficiency”.  
6 Such reasoning confuses sufficient condition with necessary condition by the following logic: 
1) Fraud on the Market Theory means that prices are affected by the dissemination of false 
information: therefore Fraud on the Market Theory (F) implies financial prices perfectly 
reflect all publicly available information (I) 
F → I 
2) since Efficient Market Hypothesis in its semi-strong version means that all publicly 
available information is reflected in financial prices   
EMT → I 
3) then Fraud on the Market Theory logically involves the EMT in its semi-strong version.  
F → EMT 
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The logical association of the Efficient Market Hypothesis with the Fraud on the 
Market Theory presupposes implicitly that all publicly available information being 
perfectly reflected in financial prices (I) is a necessary condition for evoking the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In that case, EMH and I would logically be 
reciprocal and one could not be invoked without the other. 7  However, this 
reciprocity does not exist in reality. Perfect reflection of publicly available 
information in prices is a condition for evoking the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
but it is not enough because, as recalled previously, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis also implies that people use the “true model” to value financial prices. 
In this respect, the Efficient Market Hypothesis requires the correct reflection of 
publicly information into financial prices, which must be equal to the fundamental 
value of assets. Consequently, breaking the link between price and the 
fundamental value destroys the raison d’être of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
According to the Fraud on the Market Theory as widely propounded, financial 
prices do not necessarily reflect the fundamental value. For instance, in a 
passage quoted previously, Fischel explicitly wrote: “The [Fraud on the Market] 
theory does not posit that there is some ‘true value’ of an asset other than its 
price” (Fischel 1989, 920). In this view, publicly available information must be 
reflected in price, but there is no prescription as to the model of equilibrium used 
by agents and, consequently, we are no longer concerned with fundamental 
value. This shift explains why, for the courts, a demonstration of the existence of 
fundamental value is not considered decisive in order to prove market efficiency 
(in the legal sense) (None 2006, 2286). More specifically, jurists use an 
informational efficiency in which the process related to the evolution of financial 
prices is more important than the evidence of a potential fundamental value for 
each asset. In other words, jurists are more interested in the way prices react to 
information than in the existence of an intrinsic value for these prices. In this 
juridical perspective, it is possible to use the efficient market hypothesis without 
considering the necessity to have an economic benchmark.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
This reasoning confuses sufficient condition and necessary condition. In the implication F→ I, I is 
a sufficient condition to have F – meaning that if I is true, then this is adequate grounds to 
conclude that F is true. Fraud on the Market Theory can be evoked when publicly available 
information is supposed to be integrated into financial prices. In the same vein, I is also a 
sufficient condition to evoke the semi-strong version of EMT. However, even though I is a 
sufficient condition for F and EMT, we cannot deduce any relationship between these two 
statements. Indeed, to put it in more familiar words, if the floor is wet when the weather is rainy 
(Rain → Wet Floor), and if the floor is also wet when I spray it (Spray → Wet Floor) deducting that 
I spray when it rains (Rain → Spray) is a wrong reasoning. 
7 With the reciprocal implication, we can deduce one statement from the other. If the floor is wet 
when it rains (Rain → Wet Floor) and if the floor is wet when water is spilled (Spilled water ↔ Wet 
Floor) then we can deduce that if it rains then we have a spilled water situation (Rain → Spilling 
Water) because we have a logical reciprocity between the statements Wet Floor and Spilled 
Water. 
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Although the distinction between "trading-rule efficiency" (or “mechanical 
efficiency”) and “value efficiency” seems to meet the concerns of jurists, from an 
economic viewpoint, this distinction highlights a crucial question about the 
referent chosen. Assessing whether the price reaction to new information is 
without bias requires a referent. In 1965, when Fama built the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, the referent was the fundamental value (and, as Fama explained, 
the equalization between price and fundamental value was due to arbitrage 
trading). However, in his 1970 article (which is the most widely disseminated 
article on the Efficient Market Hypothesis), Fama replaced any reference to the 
fundamental value by another economic assumption, namely the hypothesis of a 
representative agent: all agents are supposed to react to new information in the 
same way, and implicitly they all have the same equilibrium price model to 
determine the value of the asset. From an economic viewpoint, this equilibrium 
price is the "fundamental value" or the “true value” (or “true density function”, as 
Fama (1976) called it). Consequently, from an economic viewpoint, the efficient 
market hypothesis is directly associated with the existence of an intrinsic value 
implying that the distinction between the two definitions of efficiency (“trading-
rule” or “mechanical” efficiency versus “value” efficiency) is not understandable. 
Indeed, if Fraud on the Market Theory “does not posit that there is some ‘true 
value’ of an asset other than its price” (Fischel 1989, 920), then it cannot refer to 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
This difference in the use of the fundamental value demonstrates that jurists 
have developed their doctrine by considering efficiency as a way to explain how 
markets work without any reference to the “true” economic value of assets. 
 
 
II.2.b) The kind of information included in prices 
 
The second difference between the efficient market of jurists and that of 
economists has to do with the kind of information included in prices. While the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis deals with information, jurists and financial 
economists have a completely different understanding of what constitutes this 
information.  
 
For an economist, saying that “security prices reflect all available public 
information” means that only true, relevant information is reflected in prices – this 
is one of the origins of the term “fully” in Fama’s (1970) definition. The term “fully” 
is very important because it supposes that investors use the right model to price 
the stock. This definition is directly in line with the fundamental economic idea 
that individuals are perfectly rational. Economic agents, being rational, filter out 
misrepresentation and act only on true, relevant information, which they integrate 
into prices; for this reason, financial markets are said to be efficient. Fama (1976) 
clarified this point after LeRoy (1976)’s comments: 
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Thus in an efficient market the true expected return [i.e. fundamental value] on any 
security is equal to its equilibrium value [i.e. quoted price] […]. In an inefficient market, on 
the other hand, true expected returns [i.e. fundamental value] and equilibrium expected 
returns [i.e. quoted price] are not necessarily identical. In setting prices at t - 1, the market 
may overlook some of the information […], or it may use the information incorrectly 
(Fama 1976, 144). 
 
In an economic view of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, if an irrelevant item of 
information could be integrated into financial prices, then prices could not be a 
reflection of the fundamental value (or of the equilibrium value). Therefore, we 
would not have an equilibrium situation, and arbitrage would then be possible. In 
financial economics, a market in which false information was reflected in prices 
could never be efficient, by definition. 
 
For a jurist, on the contrary, the same statement (“security prices reflect all 
available public information”) means that all relevant information, true or false, is 
incorporated into the price as soon as it becomes publicly available. For instance 
Fisher (2005, 847) explained that “the essence of the efficient market hypothesis” 
was that “the market prices [of the stock] [...] impounded the falsity [i.e. false 
statement] that the defendants spoke.” Misleading information will be 
incorporated into prices at which investors buy or sell their stocks, leading to their 
being defrauded. Class actions under Rule 10b-5 are brought precisely on the 
fact that misleading or false information can be reflected into prices. 
 
In short, for jurists, if markets are efficient, then manipulation of prices through 
public false statements is possible and will impact prices while, for economists, if 
markets are efficient, manipulation of prices is totally impossible because only 
true, relevant information is incorporated into prices. As we can see, the way 
“information” is defined has a direct effect on the meaning we give to the notion 
of efficiency.  
 
 
II.3. Polymorphous definition of market efficiency and its 
consequences: current and future controversy 
 
Jurists and economists, then, do not conceive of the efficiency of markets in 
exactly the same way. The two communities use the same terminology to mean 
different things. Moreover, although jurists refer explicitly to financial economics 
to define efficiency, their use of the term runs counter to its interpretation by 
economists. As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether it is necessary for jurists 
to use financial economics to define and characterize the efficiency of financial 
markets.  
 
This question lies at the heart of the debate that arose in PolyMedica between 
the District Court (2004) and the Court of Appeal (2005). In our perspective, a 
part of these debates are rooted in the polymorphous definition of efficiency 
18 
 
introduced by economists in order to make more realistic the definition of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis. We will explain the polymorphous definition of 
efficiency and analyze its consequences, focusing on these two judgments. First 
we will analyze the question of concept transfer between the two disciplines. We 
will show that the controversy in legal terms regarding the extent of the borrowing 
from financial economics calls into question the raison d’être for the use of 
efficiency in Fraud on the Market Theory. In addition to the theoretical difficulties 
inherent in concept transfers between disciplines (a), we will highlight the 
practical implications of such borrowings in terms of the extent of the possibilities 
for securities fraud class-action lawsuits (b). 
 
 
II. 3. a) “Most” or “all and fully”: the question of transfers between 
disciplines 
 
Apart from the difficulty surrounding the status of fundamental value – attested to 
the introduction of a double definition of market efficiency by jurists (“trading-rule” 
vs. “value” efficiency) – importing the Efficient Market Hypothesis into the Fraud 
on the Market Theory has also confronted jurists with the problem of the extent of 
information that stock prices are expected to reflect. In an efficient market, are 
prices supposed to (“fully” or otherwise) reflect “most” or “all” information? This is 
what the controversy about market efficiency boiled down to in PolyMedica (2004 
and 2005). While the District Court’s 2004 judgment called for an adaptation of 
the definition of an efficient market in the legal context of Fraud on the Market 
Theory and asserted that an efficient market “is simply one in which ‘most 
publicly announced material statements about companies’ affect stock market 
prices” (PolyMedica (2004), 224 F.R.D. at 41, citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n. 
24), the defendant appealed, alleging an error of law arising from the use of 
“most” in the definition of efficiency, instead of “all” and “fully”: an efficient market, 
for all legal purposes, should really be one in which all public information is fully 
reflected in stock prices. The Court of Appeal would ratify the latter definition in 
2005. 
 
The question of the choice of “most” rather than “all” and “fully” to qualify the 
information reflected in prices in an efficient market must be seen as a 
consequence of the polymorphous conception of efficiency and of the manner in 
which concept transfers from economics into law have operated. The 
polymorphous conception comes from the initial project of Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, which was the creation of a link between three features: a 
mathematical model (the random walk model or the Martingale model), the 
concept of economic equilibrium (from the law of one price and therefore the zero 
profit at the equilibrium on a competitive market), and statistical results about the 
unpredictability of stock market prices. In this perspective, the linkage proposed 
by Fama leading to the definition he proposed in 1970 was however only one of 
many possible linkages between these three features, as subsequent literature 
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would demonstrate. Precisely, the definition of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
has changed depending on the emphasis placed by each author on a particular 
feature. For instance, Fama et al. (1969) defined an efficient market as “a market 
that adjusts rapidly to new information”; Jensen (1978) considered that “a market 
is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic 
profit by trading on the basis of information set θt”; according to Malkiel (1992) 
“the market is said to be efficient with respect to some information set […] if 
security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all 
participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set […] implies 
that it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of [that 
information set]”. To understand the implications of these choices for current 
American jurisprudence, we will now analyze one by one the justifications that 
have been put forward for the use of “fully” and “all”, and for “most.” 
 
J.A. Lipez’ view that the courts should adopt a definition of efficiency in which 
prices “fully” reflect “all” publicly available information relies on prior 
jurisprudence, in which the majority of lower courts opted for this definition taken 
unchanged from financial economics (and particularly from Fama 1970). Lipez 
concluded that it was a mistake of the District Court to depart from these 
precedents and to accept as efficient a market “in which market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about 
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” (PolyMedica 2004). At first 
glance, this decision seems to be motivated not by economic theory but by 
judicial precedent, which constitute a habitual source of law. However, it is 
noteworthy that the very first judgments on the issue called economists as expert 
witnesses to present their definition of efficiency, or cited them as authorities.8 
And although in subsequent cases economic studies no longer constituted the 
main justification for the use of this definition – even if certain judgments 
continued to refer to if (see Gariety v. Grant Thornton, 368 F.3d 356 [2004] at 
368; Fischel (1982)) – courts continued to refer to the early judgments, which had 
adopted the terms “all” and “fully” used by economists9. Therefore these terms 
imposed themselves on American courts, creating a jurisprudential trend 
invested with a wholly legal authority. By proceeding in this way, courts were 
nevertheless borrowing the definition of efficient market from financial economics 
                                            
8 In addition to LTV Securities, mentioned above, which cited the economist Van Horne directly, 
In re Bexar County Health Facility Development Securities Litigation (130 F.R.D. 602 [1990] at 
606), referred to Fama (1970), as noted by Justice Lechner in PolyMedica (2004). 
9 See for instance, Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp. (4 F.3d 286 [1993] at 289): fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance assumes "the market price has internalized all publicly available 
information"; Freeman v. Laventhol (915 F.2d 193 [1990] at 197): “the Fraud on the Market theory 
rests on the assumption that the price of an actively traded security in an open, well-developed, 
and efficient market reflects all the available information about the value of a company"; No. 84 
Employer – Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. West Holding Corp. (320 F.3d 920 
[2003] at 947): "in a modern and efficient securities market, the market price of a stock 
incorporates all available public information". 
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quite literally, taking the theory as applicable “as is,” with no adaptation for the 
judicial context10. 
The 1980 In Re LTV Securities Litigation decision, one of the first explicit uses of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis in Fraud on the Market Theory, provides a clear 
illustration of the problems posed by the literal transfer of an economics concept 
into legal theory. The District Court used Fama’s 1970 definition directly to 
characterize an efficient market:  
 
Recent economic studies tend to buttress empirically the central assumption of the Fraud 
on the Market theory – that the market price reflects all representations concerning the 
stock. Indeed, economists have now amassed sufficient empirical data to justify a present 
belief that widely-followed securities of larger corporations are “efficiently” priced: the 
market price of stocks reflects all available public information – and hence necessarily, 
any material misrepresentations as well. (LTV Securities, 88 F.R.D. at 144.) 
 
However in this judgment, the economic definition of efficiency is directly followed 
by a – theoretically contradictory – legal conclusion (“hence necessarily, any 
material misrepresentations as well”). Thus, from this moment on, the problem of 
compatibility with the financial economists’ definition of efficiency, as described 
previously, rears its head. 
 
By integrating the original definition of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (“fully”), 
jurists imported into law a specific concept which was defined in economics. This 
kind of transfer is very common: many scientific concepts have been transferred 
from one discipline to another (equilibrium from physics to economics, value from 
philosophy to sociology, etc.). From this perspective, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis is a “travelling” or a “nomadic” concept, defined by Stengers (1987) 
as a concept travelling between two (or more) fields and whose formal 
importation can require adaptation to make it workable in a new disciplinary 
context. The adaptation can be of three kinds11: a) translation of the imported 
concept in order to extend its meaning to another theoretical framework; b) 
formal analogy developed with the imported concept in order to extend its 
applicability to another topic (this adaptation often implies a mathematical 
isomorphism between two topics); c) simplification of the imported concept in 
order to render it operational in the practices of other disciplines. When jurists 
associate the Efficient Market Hypothesis with the idea that information is “fully” 
reflected in the financial prices, they are simply importing from economics the 
concept defined by Fama (1970) without adapting it to their disciplinary context. 
Jurists use the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a neutral and authoritative 
hypothesis providing a description of financial reality, understood as an 
                                            
10 On this point, it is worth bearing in mind that Fama’s work, and more generally that of the 
Chicago school research team, was widely publicized at the time of its publication and throughout 
the 1970s, and that these results were widely debated by economists (see Jovanovic (2008) for 
the debates). 
11 See Stengers (1987) for further information about the nomadic dimension of concepts. 
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uncontroversial set of facts. Preferring the standard of a “full” reflection of “all” 
public information in prices, they appear to consider that an adaptation of the 
efficiency concept is not required in order for it to be operational in law.  
 
Although this literal borrowing of economics terminology eventually prevailed, it 
was regularly contested. As early as in Basic (1988), the Supreme Court 
indicated that the courts must provide justifications for their reasoning other than 
the use of economic theory or hypothesis: 
 
We need not determine by adjudication what economists and social scientists have 
debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the application of 
economic theory. For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we 
need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced 
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices. (Basic, 485 
U.S. at 247 n. 24) 
 
In PolyMedica (2004) Justice Keeton pointed out the difference between the 
efficiency required in law in order to presume reliance by plaintiffs and the 
efficiency defined by economists. Although he acknowledged the tendency in the 
jurisprudence to prefer the definition based on “fully” and “all”, he stressed the 
fact that this jurisprudence was founded on the early judgments, which were 
mainly based on the literature of economics. For this reason, he did not use the 
literal definition of market efficiency from financial economics, preferring to base 
his legal definition of efficiency on “most”: as already formulated in Basic, an 
efficient market should be conceived as one “in which market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced material statements about 
companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” (PolyMedica (2004), 224 
F.R.D. at 40, citing Basic at 246 n. 24). To justify this usage, he also stressed the 
importance of developing legal theory independently of the process and 
methodology laid down by economics:  
 
When legal precedent is available, I follow it, not economic or academic literature. [...] 
Furthermore, it is plain in Basic that the Court did not want to adopt the “economic” or 
“academic” definition of efficient market. (PolyMedica (2004), 224 F.R.D. at 41) 
 
Following this reasoning, a more practical use of efficiency by jurists would call 
for a more flexible definition in order to convey what matters for jurists (and which 
by itself is trivial for financial economists): that public information normally 
impacts price. A definition using the term “most” seems to be better crafted for 
this practical legal purpose. Further to the rejection of this more flexible approach 
to market efficiency, when the PolyMedica appeal (2005) favoured a strict “all” 
and “fully” definition rather than the “most” definition, certain writers and judges 
stressed the problem of the applicability of the economic definition of efficiency: 
 
the PolyMedica court’s new test forces judges to engage in a hyper-theoretical inquiry 
into whether a real-word market conforms at the margins to an academic model of an 
efficient market (None 2006, 2288). 
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Indeed, jurists looked for a definition that could solve practical considerations, 
while financial economists based their definition on the necessity to make clear 
connections between some mathematical model (the random walk model), some 
empirical results, and some concept of economic equilibrium. A criterion based 
on “most” – unlike one based on “all” and “fully” – reflects a pragmatic adaptation 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis by jurists and seemed better suited to a legal 
definition of efficiency. More specifically, with a conception of efficiency based on 
“most”, jurists transform the imported concept of the efficient market in a way that 
extends its operationally. This less restrictive approach contrasts with the 
objective of theoretical foundation espoused by economists in order to better 
emphasize the plausibility of the effects of alleged public misrepresentation on 
prices. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is still mentioned, but is not used either 
as a theoretical constraint imposed by another field or as a neutral theory 
describing the financial facts. Rather, it becomes a conceptual referent, a 
theoretical starting point from which jurists must derive an appropriate efficiency 
more in line with their reality and their disciplinary context. This kind of adapted 
importation is often associated with an “action-based importation”12, in which the 
move of a notion across disciplines is governed by a need to solve complex 
problems. Since the imported concept is seen as a starting theoretical referent, 
this specific inter-disciplinarity can also generate the creation of new concepts. 
That is the case with the adaptation of efficiency to law with the use of the “most” 
criterion to define efficiency. This adaptation therefore guarantees the 
applicability of the Fraud on the Market Theory, even though it signals a move 
away from the spirit in which the economic theory of the informational efficiency 
of financial markets was created. 
 
 
II.3.b) Market efficiency and its practical outcomes: class actions and 
investor protection 
 
The difficulty of a verbatim transfer of the concept of efficient markets from one 
discipline to another is not merely a theoretical problem. On the contrary, 
whether jurists define an efficient market either as one that reflects “most” or as 
one that reflects “all” public information will determine the facility with which class 
actions can be brought in securities fraud litigation. Adopting a strict definition of 
efficiency requires a proof that stock prices fully reflect all public information: this 
situation places a much greater burden on plaintiffs before they can benefit from 
the presumption of reliance established by the Fraud on the Market Theory. 
However, efficiency in the economic sense is neither easily testable nor even 
easily applicable empirically implying that this notion is very difficult to prove in 
court. As explained, the test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis is a joint test: 
                                            
12 In accordance with the third kind of importation evoked in the previous section. 
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whenever an empirical test rejects the hypothesis of an efficient market, we 
cannot know which part of this joint hypothesis (the efficiency of the market or the 
model used to evaluate the assets) failed to work. Beyond this problem, the 
empirical tests used to test this hypothesis do not provide confident results as 
explained hereafter. 
 
Following Fama’s (1970) categorization the literature has considered three sets 
of tests according to the form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis considered. 
Indeed, the Efficient Market Hypothesis consists of three forms depending on the 
set of information considered. The first one is the weak form of efficiency, where 
the prices reflect all past information. All past history of the stock price is already 
incorporated in the stock price. Hence, the investors cannot gain a superior 
return by studying the price charts of the financial assets. In practice, if a financial 
market is weak form efficient, the observation and study of past prices and 
returns cannot lead to identifiable price patterns that can be profitably explored. 
The next form of efficiency is the semi-strong form. In this form all the publically 
available information such as “announcements of stock splits, annual reports, 
new security issues, etc.” are speedily incorporated into the prices (Fama 1970, 
388). The speed of adjustment is particularly important, since it does not allow 
the fundamental analysts to gain an advantage over the other investors. That 
means that the fundamental analysis cannot offer superior returns to investors. 
The third and final form is the strong form of efficiency, which examines the 
informational advantage of insiders. That is the case of monopolistic access to 
information that the Directors or the hedge and mutual funds with access to 
directors may have. If the markets are strong form efficient, insiders cannot earn 
an abnormal return. 
 
First of all, we must admit that the third form is quite impossible to test. The first 
should be the easier form to be tested. The economic literature has tested it by 
validating the hypothesis of the random character of stock market prices, 
because the Efficient Market Hypothesis is often considered as a synonym of the 
hypothesis of this random character. However, although the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis was created, among other purposes, in order to explain the random 
character of stock market prices, these two hypotheses are not synonymous 
(Jovanovic 2008, 2010). LeRoy (1973) and Lucas (1978) provided theoretical 
proofs that efficient markets and the martingale or random walk hypothesis are 
two distinct ideas: martingale or random walk is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for an efficient market. In a similar way, De Meyer and Saley (2003) showed that 
stock market prices follow a martingale even if all available information is not 
reflected in stock market prices. In other terms, Efficient Market Hypothesis is not 
empirically refutable since a test of the random character of stock prices does not 
imply a test of efficiency. Finally, the most convincing tests are dedicated to the 
semi-strong form of the hypothesis, and it is precisely the tests the courts mainly 
used. 
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The seminal test of semi-strong form market efficiency is due to Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (Fama et al. 1969), who examined the effects of stock splits on 
stock prices. This paper was the first to use the now classic event study 
methodology, which aims to measure the impact of a given firm-specific 
corporate event (like dividend, bonus, right issue, option listing, stock split, block 
trading, annual earning, etc.) on the prices of the company's securities. Typically, 
event studies measure the timing of security price reactions relative to the date of 
the event. In this perspective we try to detect if it is possible to make a profit 
superior to the market’s performance by trading such information just before the 
event in question. However, it is worth emphasizing that this kind of tests focuses 
more on the speed with which information has an impact on the prices rather 
than on the degree of integration of the information integrated in prices. 
 
Considering the difficulties for validating of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, a less 
literal definition of efficiency stipulating that prices must reflect “most” public 
information, is easier to satisfy. In this situation, given that the presumption of 
reliance established by Fraud on the Market Theory is itself a condition for the 
opening of a class action suit under rule 10b-5 (see part 1), it is obvious that the 
extension given to the concept of efficiency in law is quite crucial for the fate of 
securities fraud cases. 
 
More than a matter of economic interpretation, the issue of legal restrictions on 
the possibility of bringing class action suits is a matter of policy choice regarding 
appropriate protection for investors. Thus, the restrictive definition of efficiency 
imposed by PolyMedica (2005), recently reiterated by the Supreme Court 
(Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179 [2011]) seems indicative of a political concern by 
the courts to stem the proliferation of class action suits for securities fraud. That 
said, it is interesting to reposition the legal use of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
in the context of the political debate regarding the provision of proper protection 
for investors. Whereas the first references to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
were made in order to solidify the Fraud on the Market Theory and increase the 
possibilities for redress open to investors wronged by manipulation of the 
markets, the references to Efficient Market Hypothesis made after Basic (1988), 
during the 1990s and 2000s, had the opposite aim. After Basic, criticisms were 
voiced of what was seen as a proliferation of abusive litigation, where lawyers 
were said to have initiated class action suits as soon as they saw a significant 
drop in the stock price of a company, and it is only afterwards that they are 
looking for evidence of fraud (Erdlen 2011, 897). In 1995, the Congress 
responded to these criticisms by adopting its first major reform of securities law 
since the Acts of 1933 and 1934: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 [1995], codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.C.S.), which was expressly aimed at holding back class action suits (Oldham 
2003). Jurists’ interpretation of the concept of efficiency may still not be in line 
with economic theory, but it would seem to reflect their current practical concerns 
quite closely. 
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This observation leads us to question the role played by the theory of financial 
economics in legal argument, and, more precisely, in the Fraud on the Market 
Theory. In fact, as some jurists have themselves acknowledged (Oldham 2003, 
999) it is not actually necessary to invoke the Efficient Market Hypothesis in order 
to assert that a misleading statement about a company is likely to affect the price 
of its stock. The courts could have, for instance, held that reliance is not an 
element of a 10b-5 claim, but just a way to demonstrate causation (Langevoort 
2009, 157-158). Moreover, correctly understood in the framework of economic 
theory, efficiency does not justify the contention of jurists that misleading 
representations are automatically reflected in stock prices. Significantly, other 
common-law jurisdictions – Canada, the UK and Australia13 – have not followed 
U.S. law on this point since they do not recognized the Fraud on the Market 
Theory and its reference to financial economics. For instance, in Canada the 
theory was rejected by several lower courts, while in Australia not only there is no 
statutory presumption of reliance but also no evidence of plaintiffs’ attempt to 
introduce the fraud-on-the-market theory before the courts. 
 
According to Duffy (2005), the unwillingness of courts outside the United States 
to embrace the Fraud on the Market Theory is partly due to judges’ reluctance to 
exchange legal analysis, traditionally concerned with the righting of wrongs 
caused by misconduct or misleading representations. By importing economic 
theories in court, lawyers might limit their flexibility (see also Duffy 2009, 2011): 
 
One of the practical implications of theory in courts is that the determination of such an 
effect is likely to involve economic analysis rather than legal theory, so that quantum of 
damages will be the subject of expert economic evidence and debate (particularly 
statistical material) rather than legal argument. (Duffy 2005, 637) 
 
Nevertheless, this article has clearly shown the fragility of the US courts 
jurisprudence in the context of literal borrowing of terminology from economics. 
The fragility is all the more conspicuous, because other countries, whose legal 
system is based on common law, have not made use of financial economics to 
justify class actions based on Fraud on the Market Theory. We should however 
note here that American jurisprudence has been a pioneer in the development of 
this doctrine and the relevant case law cannot be simply ignored but it can be 
used as a reference point or a source of inspiration for judges internationally. 
 
Despite the fact that the basis of the efficient-market hypothesis was at odds with 
both some prior case-law and some then-current economic studies (Basic, 255-
56), as even the different measures of market efficiency were not necessarily 
                                            
13 For instance in Australia, each shareholder must demonstrate that they relied on the impugned 
conduct and that the conduct caused loss. Failure to prove causation will mean that a 
shareholder's claim will fail. (See Guglielmin v Trescowthick (No.2) (2005) 220 A.L.R. 515 at [73] 
and Johnston v McGrath (2005) 195 F.L.R. 101 at [28]-[29].) 
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clear, the theory seemed to have been the right one at the right time for the 
purposes that the Court was attempting to address’ (Dunbar and Heller 2006, 
523). The (convincing) justification can be found in the practical suitability of the 
theory in the context of class actions and securities fraud. ‘Without the … 
hypothesis, there appeared to be a loophole in using the class action remedy for 
securities fraud’ because defendants could credibly argue that individual issues 
of reliance would require separate trials on a class member by class member 
basis (Dunbar and Heller 2006, 457). In other words, Basic can only understood 
as a hybrid theory that brings together financial economics and civil procedure 
rules in an imperfect but efficient way; its prevalence for more than two decades 
highlights the importance that jurists attach to legal certainty even at the expense 
of scientific certainty. Justice White made the point that the judges in fact 
borrowed the authority of science and thereby give strength to their own (Basic, 
253). It is no surprise that the Basic presumption has not been extended to non-
securities cases.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Since the PolyMedica case, in 2005, the debate over the legal definition of 
market efficiency was dormant, but it was clear that we had not heard the last 
word yet. The Court in Halliburton II had the opportunity to revisit this hot issue 
and a vote of confidence was given to the Efficient Market Theory. However, the 
Justices did not re-examine Basic’s fundamental premises and deviate from the 
existing caselaw; they were reluctant to overrule a ‘substantive doctrine’ of 
federal securities law, despite the fact that this doctrine, and the underlying 
cause of action, are ‘judicial construct[s]’followed by interpretive errors in judge-
made law (Halliburton II, 2411 and 2425). Irrespective of whether they showed 
pragmatism or respect to the Congress’ intention to preserve the foundation of 
the fraud-on-the-market class action, the Justices reaffirmed the vitality of the 
Basic presumption and confirmed that the status quo in modern securities fraud 
action will remain the same (Coates 2015, 2). 
 
However, there is a question that still remains open and it has not been 
conclusively settled. The question to know whether an efficient market refers to a 
situation within “all” or “most” information is “fully” (or not) integrated in stock 
prices is still open. On the one hand, the use of the terms “fully” and “all” is 
justified by a line of cases interpreting a decision given by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, while on the other hand, the Supreme Court itself was the first to use the 
term “most” and, since then, it had never expressly ruled on the legal definition of 
market efficiency. In this perspective, both interpretations can be justified. 
 
The analysis in this article shows that the controversy between “most” and 
“all/fully”, far from being a mere disagreement over terminology, reveals a gap 
between two understandings of market efficiency and a tension surrounding the 
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manner in which jurists borrow/use concepts from economics. We have shown 
that, unlike the use of “fully,” taken literally from the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
the use of “most” reflects an adaptation by jurists of concepts drawn from 
financial economics. Such an adaptation of efficiency, even if it represents a 
move away from economic theory appears as a condition for its applicability to 
the legal context of Fraud on the Market Theory. 
 
Given the fragility of the US precedent and given the conceptualization of the 
“efficient market” in the Fraud on the Market Theory, it is today highly likely that a 
pronouncement on these two terminologies (“most” or “all”/”fully”) will be sought 
from the Supreme Court, which has hitherto left open the interpretations given by 
the various courts. A recent input in this debate favours the idea of replacing 
reliance on the efficiency of the market with ‘reliance on the market price not 
being impacted by (and thus reflecting) misstatements and omissions’ or, in other 
words, not being impacted by fraudulent distortion (Bebchuk and Ferrell 2014, 
686). This model is based on the idea that efficiency is not a binary concept-the 
market is either efficient or not efficient- but that efficiency is a continuum 
(Bebchuk and Ferrell 2014, 689-690). At this stage it is positive that the 
academic debate is still on and this can influence future judicial interpretations. 
As Fuller argued, we should continue to ‘take this skeleton in the family of the law 
… from its closet and examine [it] thoroughly. After that examination we may 
decide what we ought to do with it’ (Fuller 1930-31, 366). 
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